This chapter examines the long-term impact of agrarian reforms implemented in Ecuador during the 1960s and 1970s—programs intended to reduce inequality and promote rural development. Using a novel parish-level dataset and an instrumental variable strategy based on the government’s 1973 priority zone designation, the analysis shows that land redistribution under the Second Reform (1975–1978) led to a sizable and statistically significant increase in poverty by 2010—contrary to the reform’s stated goals. This result is robust to controls for baseline poverty (proxied by access to pipe water in 1962) and geographic characteristics such as land suitability. By contrast, the First Reform (1964–1970) shows no significant association with long-term poverty outcomes, including in historically marginalized Huasipungo areas. Additional analyses indicate that neither reform reduced land inequality or improved public goods provision, suggesting limited structural change in affected regions. These findings align with a scenario in which elite resistance and weak state capacity jointly constrained implementation—allowing formal reforms to advance without substantive transformation on the ground. The results underscore the limits of redistribution in settings where institutional weakness and informal elite power undermine state-led change.

What explains variation in public goods provision across local contexts? While existing research often emphasizes mass-level diversity or inequality between elites and citizens, such inequality also reflects a broader pattern: elites typically exerted disproportionate influence over public investment—especially where democratic institutions were weak. This paper examines how internal elite composition shaped public goods provision in early 20th century Ecuador. It argues that elite heterogeneity—measured as the number of distinct elite families within a locality—is associated with higher levels of provision. Using 1908 historical records, I construct a parish-level index of elite heterogeneity from 2,200 elite surnames and match it to a 1914 inventory of state-owned assets, used as a proxy for local public investment. The results show a robust positive relationship between elite heterogeneity and public goods, even after accounting for geography, population, and elite density. Drawing on descriptive evidence of elite networks and institutions, the paper suggests that heterogeneity generates distinct but overlapping interests that are harder to satisfy privately—encouraging public investment, especially where elites are socially or institutionally connected. The findings highlight the political importance of elite heterogeneity and contribute to broader debates on state capacity, elite behavior, and public goods.

Recent research suggests that politically excluded elites play a crucial role in revolutions and regime transitions. However, little research has been conducted on the factors that lead to the emergence of these elites. We propose that international trade is an important yet understudied cause of the emergence of such elites. In agrarian, commodity-exporting countries, economic integration can be highly lucrative for the incumbent government. However, shifts in international demand for commodities, such as those driven by technological innovations, create opportunities for individuals outside the autocratic coalition---such as landowners in politically marginalized regions---to gain economic power. In this project, we leverage shifts in American imports of agricultural commodities during the Second Industrial Revolution as an exogenous cause of the emergence of anti-regime elites during the Mexican Revolution. Using biographical data on over 5,000 key figures from the Mexican Revolution, we identify and geolocate elite revolutionary leaders. Our analysis shows that the local trade shock intensity is significantly associated with the emergence of elite revolutionary leaders in regions where local elites were politically marginalized. Our study provides causal evidence that trade shocks can create elites who are politically excluded yet economically powerful, highlighting international trade as a critical yet previously overlooked driver of elite-led regime change.