I am a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at New York University. My research examines the relationship between economic resources, political power, and state development. I study when elites gain access to political power, how elite organization shapes political outcomes, and whether major shocks such as war and redistribution transform societies on their own or only through the institutions already in place.
My job market paper examines how established elites solved the commitment problem of incorporating newly wealthy economic elites into politics. Using evidence from Peru during the export boom, I show how marriage ties and hierarchical institutions allowed established elites to extend political access while limiting the risk of defection.
My work focuses on Latin America and combines archival research, original data collection, and causal inference. Drawing on tax registries, marriage records, political rosters, census manuscripts, and business directories, I construct new datasets to study questions at the intersection of comparative politics, political economy, and historical development. The project has been supported by a National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant. My work is forthcoming in the Journal of Historical Political Economy and in Roots of Underdevelopment, Volume 2. In 2026, I received the Outstanding Teaching Award from the NYU College of Arts and Sciences.
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